

POLI 6245  
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY  
SPRING 2011

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Class Meeting: Tu 6:00-8:45pm  
Classroom: MH 316  
Office Hours: Tu/We/Th 3-5pm  
and by appointment

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*This Version: January 18, 2011*

Course Description

This seminar focuses on the structural and strategic causes of foreign policy. The emphasis is on the United States' foreign policy due to its unique role in international affairs over the last century, but we will address questions applicable to other states' foreign affairs. The causes of foreign policy will be explored in more depth than their effects. The theoretical concepts of the policy-making process, the interface between domestic, foreign, and national security policies and politics, and the role of bureaucratic politics will also be covered.

It is impossible to cover all relevant material in one course. The readings we will cover are a mix of classic works that active members of our field are familiar with along with more recent and state-of-the-art research. I introduce several ongoing debates in the study of foreign policy as a means to encourage you to think about the material and come to your own conclusions. Ideally, your reading and research for this class can be developed into a conference presentation, journal article, or dissertation topic.

Class Meetings

This class meets Tuesdays from 6pm to 8:45pm. Reading the assigned works prior to class is essential as is attendance and attentiveness.

Student Learning Objectives

After successfully completing this course, students will be able to 1) define key concepts in foreign policy; 2) explain different theories about the structural and strategic causes of foreign policy; and 3) be able to take a position on the major debates in the field. Additionally, a major objective of this class is to enable students to identify and develop topics for their own research.

Course Requirements

Participation is essential to a successful seminar; as is an engagement with the material. You do not have to agree with the material presented either by me or by the authors we will read. What I do expect you to do is to engage with the material and the class discussion, think about the issues they raise, come to your own conclusions, and be able to convey them to others.

As a result, your course grade will be determined by four components: 1) class participation, 2) short papers responding to the week's reading, 3) a research paper, and 4) a poster presentation of your research paper. Your grade will be calculated as follows:

20%	Discussion/Participation
40%	Response papers (4)
10%	Poster Presentation
30%	Research paper (20-30 pages)

## **Discussion/Participation**

To do well in this class (like any graduate-level class) it is necessary to actively participate in class discussion. Discussion is the lifeblood of a graduate seminar. This does not mean that dominating the discussion with nonsensical ramblings will help your grade. Rather, I evaluate participation 1) on the quality of your comments and 2) on whether the seminar was better for you having attended.

It should go without saying that attendance is a necessary condition for participation. Attendance is mandatory.

## **Response Papers**

You will be responsible for writing four short (2-3 page) response papers. Each paper should focus on one particular reading during a week of your choice. Choices will be assigned on a first come, first served basis using a dedicated Blackboard discussion thread.

Your response papers should not summarize the readings. Rather, they should make an *argument* about or be a *reaction* to the selected readings. What did you find puzzling or unconvincing about the authors' arguments? How and why would you approach their theoretical questions differently?

These reaction papers are due at the start of class on the day that the readings are due to be discussed. Reaction papers must be submitted digitally to the class's Blackboard discussion board Monday night at midnight before the start of class. Therefore, other students will be able to read your work before the start of class. They will be useful for PhD students taking comps. More than one paper cannot be submitted per class. Late papers will be penalized.

These papers are short but they require an intense engagement with the readings and multiple close readings of the works are essential. They will be evaluated based on how effectively they examine the work in question, their thoughtfulness, and how effectively you lead discussion on this work.

## **Poster Presentation**

During class on Week 16 (May 3rd), all students will present posters summarizing the main parts of their research paper. The rest of the department will be invited to attend. A poster presentation is one of the primary ways that graduate students begin to present their research at political science conferences and are becoming increasingly popular. This exercise will enable you to gather experience in presenting your research to other social scientists both visually as well as through brief interpersonal interactions. More details and web guides to creating a poster will be discussed in class. In general, however posters are up to 8' by 4' and can be placed on walls or tri-fold poster-boards readily available from office supply stores like Office Depot.

## **Research Papers**

You will be required to write a research paper for this class. The earlier you start to think about possible topics the lower your stress level will be and the more time you can spend finding sources and honing your argument.

The paper has to have something to do with foreign policy, but the specific subject matter is up to you. You must choose your topic and turn in a 3-5 page paper proposal due March 15<sup>th</sup>. This proposal should summarize 1) the motivating question your paper will address, 2) the argument that you think answers this question, and 3) the sources you are planning to use. This paper should be one that you can revise for presentation at a conference in the hopes of eventually revising it for publication. We will discuss in more detail during class my expectations for a graduate-level research paper. The final paper is due by Tuesday May 10th at 5pm. Late papers will be penalized one letter grade for every 24 hours they are late.

### Academic Integrity

Academic integrity is fundamental to the process of learning and evaluating academic performance. Academic dishonesty will not be tolerated. Academic dishonesty includes, but is not limited to, the following: cheating, plagiarism, tampering with academic records and examinations, falsifying identity, and being an accessory to acts of academic dishonesty. Refer to the UNO Judicial Code for further information.

The Code is available online at:

[http://www.studentaffairs.uno.edu/Judicial/judicial\\_pdfs/AcademicDishonestyPolicy.pdf](http://www.studentaffairs.uno.edu/Judicial/judicial_pdfs/AcademicDishonestyPolicy.pdf).

You will submit a digital copy of all your written work to SafeAssign software on Blackboard, which traces whether sentences originate in other works. If there is evidence of plagiarism it will be punished to the fullest extent possible. Neither ignorance of what constitutes plagiarism nor a lack of intent to plagiarize are not acceptable defenses. If you have questions about what constitutes plagiarism, please ask me.

### Blackboard

Blackboard is a useful tool that will be used extensively for this course for announcements, and posting grades. During the course I will make some readings available and post interesting articles I encounter (and that I expect you to read) in the documents section. It is advisable to check Blackboard often.

### Accommodations for Students with Disabilities

Students who qualify for services will receive the academic modifications for which they are legally entitled. It is the responsibility of the student to register with the Office of Disability Services (UC260) each semester and follow their procedures for obtaining assistance.

### Assigned Readings

There are five (5) assigned books available from the UNO Bookstore or from online booksellers. Online stores are usually significantly cheaper, but you need to plan ahead so as to receive them in time to read them and discuss them in class. Not receiving the book in time for class is not an acceptable excuse for not doing the assigned readings.

1. Lake, David A. 1999. *Entangling Relations: American Foreign Policy in Its Century*. Princeton University Press. ISBN: 978-0691059914.
2. Martin, Lisa L. 2000. *Democratic Commitments: Legislatures and International Cooperation*. Princeton University Press. ISBN: 978-1400823703.
3. Palmer, Glenn, and T. Clifton Morgan. 2006. *A Theory of Foreign Policy*. Princeton University Press. ISBN: 978-0691146553.
4. Powell, Robert. 1999. *In the Shadow of Power: States and Strategies in International Relations*. Princeton University Press. ISBN: 978-0691004570.
5. Schultz, Kenneth A. 2001. *Democracy and Coercive Diplomacy*. Cambridge University Press. ISBN: 978-0521796699.

In addition to the above books, I have assigned a number of scholarly journal articles. All articles are available through Blackboard, the library's website, or through Google Scholar. If you have any questions about accessing e-journals using the UNO Library's website, please let me know.

Furthermore, it is useful to keep up to date about current events relevant to this course. On my website (<http://richardwfrank.com>) there are links to sources that might be useful in your response papers and researching your paper project. I also post links on my website to a number of blogs that are relevant to this course.

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## COURSE SCHEDULE

This reading list is subject to change. Updates to this syllabus will be posted on Blackboard. All required readings must be completed before the start of class. The weekly readings are ordered chronologically.

### Part 1: State level

#### Week 1: Jan. 18—Introduction/review/levels of analysis

Waltz, Kenneth. 1959. *Man, the State, and War*. New York: Columbia University Press: chap. 1.

Singer, J. David. 1961. "The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Politics." *World Politics* 14(1): 77-92.

Jervis, Robert. 1976. "Chapter 1: Perception and the Level of Analysis Problem." In *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press: 13-31.

Wendt, Alexander E. 1987. "The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory." *International Organization* 41(3): 335-370.

Ikenberry, G. John, David A. Lake, and Michael Mastanduno. 1988. "Introduction: Approaches to Explaining American Foreign Economic Policy." *International Organization* 42(1): 1-14.

Lake, David A. 2008. "The State and International Relations." In *The Oxford Handbook of International Relations*. Edited by Christian Reus-Smit and Duncan Snidal. New York: Oxford University Press: 41-61.

#### Week 2: Jan. 25—Unitary actor models I: What do states want and how do they get it?

Lake, David A. 1992. "Powerful Pacifists: Democratic States and War." *American Political Science Review* 86(1): 24-37.

Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, James D. Morrow, Randolph Siverson, and Alastair Smith. 1999. "An Institutional Explanation of the Democratic Peace." *American Political Science Review* 93(4): 791-807.

Muthoo, Abhinay. 2000. "A Non-Technical Introduction to Bargaining Theory." *World Economics* 1(2): 145-166.

Powell, Robert. 1999. *In the Shadow of Power: States and Strategies in International Relations*. Princeton University Press. Ch. 1 (3-39).

Gelpi, Christopher, and Peter D. Feaver. 2002. "Speak Softly and Carry a Big Stick? Veterans in the Political Elite and the American Use of Force." *American Political Science Review* 96(4): 779-793.

Sechser, Todd S. 2004. "Are Soldiers Less War-Prone than Statesmen?" *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 48(5): 746-74.

**Week 3: Feb. 1—Unitary actor models II: Can states want more than one thing?**

Palmer, Glenn, and T. Clifton Morgan. 2006. *A Theory of Foreign Policy*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. All.

**Week 4: Feb. 8—Psychological approaches**

Jervis, Robert. 1968. "Hypotheses on Misperception." *World Politics* 20(3): 454-479.

Goldgeier, James M., and Philip E. Tetlock. 2001. "Psychology and International Relations Theory." *Annual Review of Political Science* 4: 67-92.

Brewer, Paul R., Kimberly Gross, Sean Aday, and Lars Willnat. 2004. "International Trust and Public Opinion about World Affairs." *American Journal of Political Science* 48(1): 93-109.

Horowitz, Michael, Rose McDermott, and Alan Stam. 2005. "Leader Age, Regime Type, and Violent International Relations." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 49(5): 661-85.

Huddy, Leonie, Stanley Feldman, Charles Taber, and Gallya Lahav. 2005. "Threat, Anxiety, and Support of Antiterrorism Policies." *American Journal of Political Science* 49(3): 593-608.

Keller, Jonathan W. 2005. "Leadership Style, Regime Type, and Foreign Policy Crisis Behavior." *International Studies Quarterly* 49(2): 205-31.

**Week 5: Feb. 15—Bureaucratic approaches**

Allison, Graham T. 1969. "Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis." *American Political Science Review* 63(3): 689-718.

Art, Robert J. 1973. "Bureaucratic Politics and American Foreign Policy: A Critique." *Policy Sciences* 4(4): 467-90.

Levy, Jack S. 1986. "Organizational Routines and the Causes of War." *International Studies Quarterly* 30(2): 193-222.

Bendor, Jonathan, and Thomas H. Hammond. 1992. "Rethinking Allison's Models." *American Political Science Review* 86(2): 310-22.

Rhodes, Edward. 1994. "Do Bureaucratic Politics Matter? Some Disconfirming Evidence from the Case of the U.S. Navy." *World Politics* 47(1): 1-41.

McKeown, Timothy J. 2001. "Plans and Routines. Bureaucratic Bargaining, and the Cuban Missile Crisis." *Journal of Politics* 63(4): 1163-1190.

## **Week 6: Feb. 22—Constructivist approaches**

- Wendt, Alexander E. 1987 "The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory." *International Organization* 41(3): 335-370. [skim it again along with your notes]
- Finemore, Martha. 1996. "Constructing Norms of Humanitarian Intervention." In *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*. Edited by Peter J. Katzenstein. New York: Columbia University Press: 153-185.
- Checkel, Jeffrey, 1998. "The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory." *World Politics* 50: 324-348.
- Moravcsik, Andrew. 1999. "Is Something Rotten in the State of Denmark? Social Constructivism and European Integration." *Journal of European Public Policy* 6(4): 669-81.
- Barnett, Michael. 1999. "Culture, Strategy and Foreign Policy Change: Israel's Road to Oslo." *European Journal of International Relations* 5(1): 5-36.
- Houghton, David Patrick. 2007. "Reinvigorating the Study of Foreign Policy Decision Making: Toward a Constructivist Approach." *Foreign Policy Analysis* 3: 24-45.

## **Part 2: Domestic Level**

### **Week 7: Mar. 1—Domestic foreign policy conflicts/State-society interests**

- Frieden, Jeffry. 1988. "Sectoral Conflict and United States Foreign Economic Policy." *International Organization* 42(1): 59-90.
- Powell, Robert. 1999. *In the Shadow of Power: States and Strategies in International Relations*. Princeton University Press. Ch. 2.
- Hiscox, Michael J. 2001. "Class Versus Industry Cleavages: Inter-Industry Factor Mobility and the Politics of Trade." *International Organization* 55(1): 1-46.
- Fordham, Benjamin O., and Timothy J. McKeown. 2003. "Selection and Influence: Interest Groups and Congressional Voting on Trade Policy." *International Organization* 57(3): 519-49.
- Colaresi, Michael. 2004. "When Doves Cry: International Rivalry, Unreciprocated Cooperation, and Leadership Turnover." *American Journal of Political Science* 48(3): 555-570.
- Baker, Andy. 2005. "Who Wants to Globalize? Consumer Tastes and Labor Markets in a Theory of Trade Policy Beliefs." *American Journal of Political Science* 49(4): 924-938.
- Jacobs, Lawrence R., and Benjamin I. Page. 2005. "Who Influences U.S. Foreign Policy?" *American Political Science Review* 99(1): 107-123.

### **Week 8: Mar. 8—No Class/Spring Break/Mardi Gras**

### **Week 9: Mar. 15—Political parties (Proposal due)**

Hibbs, Douglas A. 1977. "Political Parties and Macroeconomic Policy." *American Political Science Review* 71(4): 1467-1487.

Therien, Jean-Philippe, and Alain Noel. 2000. "Political Parties and Foreign Aid." *American Political Science Review* 94(1): 151-162.

Fordham, Benjamin O. 2002. "Domestic Politics, International Pressure, and the Allocation of American Cold War Military Spending." *Journal of Politics* 64(1): 63-88.

Milner, Helen V., and Benjamin Judkins. 2004. "Partisanship, Trade Policy, and Globalization: Is There a Left-Right Divide on Trade Policy?" *International Studies Quarterly* 48(1): 95-119.

Schultz, Kenneth A. 2005. "The Politics of Risking Peace: Do Hawks or Doves Deliver the Olive Branch?" *International Organization* 59(1): 1-38.

### **Week 10: Mar. 22—Domestic institutions**

Putnam, Robert D. 1988. "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games." *International Organization* 42(3): 427-460.

Fearon, James. 1994. "Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes." *American Political Science Review* 88(3): 577-592.

Ramsay, Kristopher W. 2004. "Politics at the Water's Edge: Crisis Bargaining and Electoral Competition." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 48(4): 459-486.

Clark, David, and William Reed. 2005. "Strategic Sources of Foreign Policy Substitution." *American Journal of Political Science* 49(3): 609-624.

Michael Tomz. 2007. "Domestic Audience Costs in International Relations: An Experimental Approach." *International Organization* 61: 821-840.

Gartzke, Eric. 2007. "The Capitalist Peace." *American Journal of Political Science* 51(1): 166-191.

### **Week 11: Mar. 29— Public Opinion**

Holsti, Ole R. 1992. "Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: Challenges to the Almond-Lippmann Consensus Mershon Series: Research Programs and Debates." *International Studies Quarterly* 36(4): 439-466.

Kuperman, Ranan D. "The Effect of Domestic and Foreign Pressure on Israeli Decisions to Use Limited Military Force." *Journal of Peace Research* 40(6): 677-694.

Gelpi, Christopher, Peter D. Feaver, and Jason Riefler. 2005. "Success Matters: Casualty Sensitivity and the War in Iraq." *International Security* 30(3): 7-46.

Tomz, Michael. 2007. "Domestic Audience Costs in International Relations: An Experimental Approach." *International Organization* 61(4): 821-840.

Weeks, Jessica L. 2008. "Autocratic Audience Costs: Regime Type and Signaling Resolve." *International Organization* 62(1): 35-64.

Defoe, Allan. 2011. Statistical Critiques of the Democratic Peace: Caveat Emptor." *American Journal of Political Science*. Forthcoming.

### **Part 3: System Level**

#### **Week 12: Apr. 5—International Institutions**

Lake, David A. 1999. *Entangling Relations*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. All.

#### **Week 13: Apr. 12—Alliances/Cooperation**

Martin, Lisa L. 2000. *Democratic Commitments: Legislatures and International Cooperation*. Princeton University Press. All.

Leeds, Brett Ashley. 2003. "Alliance Reliability in Times of War: Explaining State Decisions to Violate Treaties." *International Organization* 57(4): 801-827.

#### **Week 14: Apr. 19—Political and military instruments of statecraft**

Fearon, James D. 1997. "Signaling Foreign Policy Interests: Tying Hands Versus Sinking Costs." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 41(1): 68-90.

Powell, Robert. 1999. *In the Shadow of Power: States and Strategies in International Relations*. Princeton University Press. Ch. 3.

Owen, John M. 2002. "The Foreign Imposition of Domestic Institutions." *International Organization* 56(2): 375-409.

Enterline, Andrew J., and Matthew Greig. 2005. "Beacons of Hope? The Impact of Imposed Democracy on Regional Peace, Democracy, and Prosperity." *Journal of Politics* 67(4): 1075-98.

#### **Week 15—Apr. 26—Economic influences**

Olson, Mancur, Jr., and Richard Zeckhauser. 1966. "An Economic Theory of Alliances." *Review of Economics and Statistics* 48(3): 266-279.

Hirschman, Albert O. 1980 [1945]. *National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press: 3-52.

Martin, Lisa L. 1992. "Credibility, Costs, and Institutions: Cooperation on Economic Sanctions." *World Politics* 45(3): 406-432.



Drury, A. Cooper. 2001. "Sanctions as Coercive Diplomacy: The U.S. President's Decision to Initiate Economic Sanctions." *Political Research Quarterly* 54(3): 485-508.

Drezner, Daniel W. 2003. "The Hidden Hand of Economic Coercion." *International Organization* 57(3): 643-59.

Younas, Javed. "Motivation for Bilateral Aid Allocation: Altruism or Trade Benefits." *European Journal of Political Economy* 24(3): 661-674.

Stone, Randall W. 2004. "The Political Economy of IMF Lending in Africa." *American Political Science Review* 98(4): 577-91.

**Week 16—May 3—Poster Session**

Final papers due on May 10<sup>th</sup> by 5pm.